ABSTRACT: The exploratory analysis developed in this paper relies on the hypothesis that each editor possesses some power in the definition of the editorial policy of her journal. Consequently if the same scholar sits on the board of editors of two journals, those journals could have some common elements in their editorial policies. The proximity of the editorial policies of two scientific journals can be assessed by the number of common editors sitting on their boards. A database of all editors of ECONLIT journals is used. The structure of the network generated by interlocking editorship is explored by applying the instruments of network analysis. Evidences have been found of a compact network containing different components. This is interpreted as the result of a plurality of perspectives about the appropriate methods for the investigation of problems and the construction of theories within the domain of economics.
4 generated between a pair of journals by the presence of at least a same editor in the board of both. This network is generated by a simple transformation of the dual-mode or affiliation network (de Nooy, Mrvar and Batagelj, 2005; Wasserman and Faust, 1994 ). An affiliation network is a network in which the vertices are divided in two sets (actors and events) and the affiliation connects vertices from the two different sets only. In our case affiliation (being member of the board) connects a scientist to a journal. Our attention will be focused on the links generated between journals through the affiliations of scientists. It is worth remarking that the present framework is similar to that considered in interlocking directorship analysis, which is probably the most developed field of application of dual mode network analysis. An interlocking directorate occurs when a person sitting on the board of directors of a firm also sits on the board of another firm. Those interlocks have become the primary indicator of inter-firm network ties. An inter-firm tie can be explained as the result of a strategic decision of the firms, as collusion, or cooptation or monitoring of sources of environmental uncertainty (Mizruchi, 1996 ant the reference cited therein). In analogy with interlocking directorates analysis, we will refer to the phenomenon here considered as interlocking editorship.
The issues on which we focus are: which are the most central journals of the network and which are the most peripheral? Which journals have the most influence over others? Does the community of economists break down into smaller groups? If so what are they? More in general is it possible to separate schools of thought, methodologies or pattern of research characterizing the scientific community under scrutiny? And it is possible to infer something about the functioning of the "market of research" in the domain of economics?
Editorial boards
Cogent answers to those questions require a significant unit of observation at the basis of our research. To the best of our knowledge, no literature presents extensive discussions about the role of the board of editors for scientific journals; but we have anecdotal evidence and some recent tentative generalizations. Traditionally the main function of the board of editors was to determine which articles were appropriate for publication. In the last two or three decades this function has 5 changed. The diffusion of the anonymous referees process allows the board of editors to work for obtaining and evaluating referees: "The job of both the editors and the referees is to do 'peer review'" (Coupe, 2004) . In every case the role of editors can be considered of some relevance in steering discipline, and pushing or suppressing various lines of research (for some anecdotal evidence see Stigler, Stigler and Friedland, 1995 and the reference therein). Probably an editor's objective is to produce a journal of high quality. The advent of modern bibliometric indicators, as the impact factor, slightly modified the traditional problem of editors: journal editors compete now with each other to attract the best papers, i.e. the papers with highest probability to be cited. The instruments used by editors to attract the best papers are the reputation of the journal, the reduction in transaction costs involved in the publication process, but also favoritism for individuals or institutions (Laband and Piette, 1994; Medoff, 2003) .
Recently some general models of the functioning of the market for publication has been developed. Faria (2005) models the market for research as a game populated by two kind of agents:
authors and editors, with some market power. Authors seek to maximise the number of their publications and the impact of their work in the literature, captured by citations. Editors maximise the quality of papers they publish in order to increase the reputation of their journals. High reputation journals are journals often cited in the literature, i.e. journals with high impact factor.
Authors searching to increase the probability to be cited, compete to publish in journals with a high reputation. As a consequence "editors of journals with strong reputations enjoy an enormous amount of power in their hands" (Faria, 2005) . The competition between authors generates a pressure to publish which open the space to new journal and new editors, which, at their turn, seek to position their journals in empty niches and to adopt strategies to improve their impact factor. The overall result of this mechanism is largely positive driving the system toward the enhancement of research quality (Goel and Faria, forthcoming) . A more critical view is developed by Frey (2003; starting from a property rights approach. According to Frey, there are more than two groups of actors in the academic publishing system: notably publishers, editors, referees and authors. Each groups owns different property rights on the scientific journal. And the behavior of each group must be modeled according the traditional rational choice model of man. Commercial publishers owning 6 complete private property rights on various journals, search to maximize profits. They are interested in the quality and reputation of the journals. A high quality journal has market power, and market power permits the gain of profits. Editors enjoy property rights on their journal; they are interested in the quality of their journal because this enhances their academic reputation. Authors, as we have seen in Faria's model, are interested in publishing their article in high reputation journals. A large amount of decision power over the publishing process is detained by the referees who have no property right at all on the journals. So it is at least incoherent to model them as acting only in the interest of the science or quality of the research, as for example in Engers and Gans (1998) .
Personal interest can play a role in their choices. "Many referees will be tempted to judge papers according to whether their own contribution are sufficiently appreciated and their own publications quoted" (Frey, 2003) . The diffusion of anonymous referee processes reduced drastically, at least in economics, the power of editors. This reduction can have negative consequences on the overall quality of research, driving the authors to "intellectually prostitute themselves by slavishly following the demands made by anonymous referees who have no property rights to the journals they advise" (Frey, 2003) . Evidence on three of the most eminent journals in economics shows that in the last years the power of editors in accepting or rejecting paper is anew growing, driving, as a consequence, to the publication of papers authored by scholars concentrated in few highly reputed institutions in the United States (Wu, 2007) .
From the point of view of this article, the moral of the story is trivial: the board of editors have some power in shaping the editorial processes and policies of scientific journals. Because of their importance, it appears reasonable that the positions on the boards are held by "persons who have the confidence and trust of their colleagues in the journal's areas of coverage for the journal to be successful in attracting quality submissions and in building and maintaining a reputation for quality. Thus, selection as an editor or member of an editorial board is a considerable honor that reflects one's standing in the profession as evaluated by his or her peers" (Kaufman, 1984) . Unsurprisingly, members of the editorial board usually place this information in evidence in their curriculum vitae; and it is universally recognized that to be a member of an editorial board is a signal of the esteem reserved to a scholar by the academic community.
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The esteem or reputation of a scientist is shared also by her institution given that her affiliation is clearly displayed in the journal. This point was stressed by some empirical papers which ranked academic institutions on the basis of their representation on the editorial boards of top journals (Gibbons and Fish, 1991; Kaufman, 1984) . Interestingly enough, Gibbons and Fish (1991) found that there is a correlation between the ranking of institutions based on the membership of their affiliated scholars on editorial boards and those based on citations and publications in top journals. Hodgson and Rothman (1999) did not find surprising at all that editors and authors who ranked according to some quality (merit, prestige, citation) came from the best institutions ranked according to the same criterion. This can be explicable in terms of "familiar mechanism and cultural processes" (Hodgson and Rothman, 1999) . In a nutshell: "having an editor increases the member of the departments' chance to publish in that journal" (Coupe, 2004 and the references cited therein).
In the case of economics, Hodgson and Rothman present data evidencing a strong concentration of editors and authors in few academic institutions of the United States, and argue that this institutional oligopoly may be unhealthy for the development of innovative research.
As already anticipated, this paper approaches the question of the membership of an editorial board from a perspective slightly different from the ones seen above. We are interested in the relation between the editorial policies of the various journal and we would infer some considerations on this topic by studying the cross-presence of the editors in their boards.
It is apparent that editorial boards have some power in shaping the editorial processes and policies of economic journals. Therefore, our perspective is based on the hypothesis that each editor may influence the editorial policy of her journal. Consequently if the same individual sits in the board of two journals, those journals could have some common elements in their editorial policies.
It is evident that we will not be concerned with direct observations of the editorial policies adopted by the boards of economic journals. We will infer considerations about the similarity of editorial policies through the observation of the presence of scholars in the boards of editor.
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Centre and periphery in the interlocking editorship network
First, it should be emphasized that the empirical notion of editor adopted in this paper is very broad. Indeed, it covers all the individuals listed as editor, co-editor, member of the editorial board or of the advisory editorial board. There is no evidence regarding the roles of different kinds of editors in the editorial process (possibly apart from the role of editor-in-chief) and a single title such as managing editor may often entail very different roles for different journals. Hence, as in Hodgson and Rothman (1999) , the broad definition is assumed.
The affiliation network database was constructed ad hoc for this paper. We have included in our research 746 journals present in the ECONLIT database and with an active editorial board in January 2006. That is we excluded from the database journals ceased before January 2006.
According to common wisdom, this set of journals includes all major scientific journals in the field of economics.
The data on the members of the editorial boards was directly obtained from the website of the journals or -for the few cases when the site was unavailable -from the hard copy. The data was collected from March to July 2006 considering the boards published on the websites of the journals in that period. When the hard copy was necessary, the board considered was that of the first issue in 2006 or, alternatively, that of the last issue in 2005. Moreover, the database was managed by means of the package Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2006; de Nooy et al., 2005) .
In this database, 21,525 seats were available on the editorial boards and they were occupied by 15,921 scholars. The average number of seats per journal turned out to be 28.9, while the average number of seats occupied by each scholar (i.e. the mean rate of participation) was 1.35. The number of lines linking the journals is 6,407, and the density of the interlocking directorship network (i.e. the ratio of the actual number of lines to the maximum possible number of lines in the network) is 0.023. This means that only 2.3% of the possible lines is present (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . A comparison with statistical journals network (Baccini, Barabesi and Marcheselli, 2008) shows that economic journals network is much more dispersed than the statistical one.
The graph of the network is reported in Figure 1 In order to consider an initial exploratory analysis, the degree distribution has been provided.
In the present setting, the degree of a journal is the number of lines which it shares with the other journals. Table I A main concern in network analysis is to distinguish between the centre and the periphery of the network. In our case, the problem is to distinguish between the economic journals which have a central position in the network and those in the periphery. As suggested by Wasserman and Faust (1994) , three centrality measures for each journal in the network may be adopted. The simplest measure for the centrality of a journal is represented by its degree: indeed, the more ties a journal has to other journals, the more central is its position in the network. For example, the Pacific
Economic Review is linked with 124 journals, while Journal of Development and Economic Policies
is linked with solely one. Hence, the first is more central in the network than the second. In addition, the normalized degree of a journal is the ratio of its degree to the maximum possible degree (i.e. the number of journals minus 1). Thus, the Pacific Economic Review is linked with about 16.6% of the other journals in the network, while Statistical Modelling is linked with only 0.001%. Table A1 contains the degree and the normalized degree for the journals considered. An overall measure of centralization in the network (based on marginal degrees) is given by the socalled degree centralization (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . In this case, the index turns out to be 0.14, showing that the network of economic journals is less centralized than the one of statistical journals for which the degree centralization is 0.34 (Baccini et al., 2008) .
The second centrality measure is given by closeness centrality, which is based on the distance between a journal and all the other journals. In the network analysis, the distance between two vertices is usually based on so-called geodesic distance. Geodesic is the shortest path between two vertices, while its length is the number of lines in the geodesic ( (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) .
Hence, the closeness centrality of a journal is the number of journals (linked to this journal by a path) divided by the sum of all the distances (between the journal and the linked journals). The basic idea is that a journal is central if its board can quickly interact with all the other boards.
Journals occupying a central location with respect to closeness can be very effective in communicating information (sharing research, sharing papers, deciding editorial policies) to other journals. Table A1 contains the closeness centrality for economic journals. By focussing on the connected network of 640 journals, it is possible to compute the overall closeness centrality of journals (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . The overall closeness centrality is 0.29, showing in turn that the network of economic journals is less centralized than the statistical one [0.35].
The third considered measure is the so-called betweenness centrality. The idea behind the index is that similar editorial aims between two non-adjacent journals might depend on other journals in the network, especially on those journals lying on the paths between the two. The other journals potentially might have some control over the interaction between two non-adjacent journals. Hence, a journal is more central in this respect if it is an important intermediary in links between other journals. From a formal perspective, the betweenness centrality of a journal is the proportion of all paths between pairs of other journals that include this journal. Table A1 contains the betweenness centrality of the economic journals. For example, the Pacific Economic Review is in about 4% of the paths linking all other journals in the network. It is interesting to note that in the statistical journal network, the two journals with higher betweenness are each in about 12% of the paths linking all other journals (Baccini et al., 2008) . In turn, the overall betweenness centralization of the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994 ) is 0.04; also in the case of this index the centralization is lower than in the network of statistical journal [0.10].
It is worth noting the ranking similarity of the three centrality measures. This item is emphasized by the high value of Kendall's concordance index which equals 0.95 (for more details on Kendall's tau and concordance indexes see e.g. Gibbons and Chakraborti, 1992) .
Valued network analysis
It is interesting to consider the strength of the relationship between journals. The network of journals can be characterized as a valued network. More precisely, in a valued network the lines have a value indicating the strength of the tie linking two vertices (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . In our case the value of the line is the number of editors sitting on the board of the two journals linked by that line. Table III shows the distribution of line values: 74.6% of the links are generated by journals sharing only one editor and about 94% are generated by journals sharing three or less editors.
In social network analysis it is usual to consider lines with higher value to be more important since they are less personal and more institutional (de Nooy et al., 2005) . In the case of the journal network, the basic idea is very simple: the editorial proximity between two journals can be Starting from this basis it is possible to define cohesive subgroups, i.e. subsets of journals among which there are relatively strong ties. In a valued network a cohesive subgroup is a subset of vertices among which ties have a value higher than a given threshold. In our case, a cohesive subgroup of journals is a set of journals sharing a number of editors equal or higher than the 14 threshold. In our interpretation, a cohesive subgroup of journals is a subgroup with a similar editorial policy, belonging to the same subfield of the discipline or sharing a common methodological approach. Following de Nooy et al. (2005) , cohesive subgroups are identified as weak components in m-slices, i.e. subsets for which the threshold value is at least m.
As previously remarked, the network of statistical journals is not compact: there is a big component of 670 journals and all the others are isolated. The search for cohesive subgroups strengthens this path: fixing a minimum value of threshold to 2 the big component reduces to 474 journals, 13 components emerge of 2-4 journals, and the isolated journals grow to 242. With 3 the big component reduces to 284 journals and isolated journals grow to 369. With higher threshold value, the network gives rise to components worthy of being noticed here.
In particular we focused our attention on the weak components emerging in 6-slices network.
It is possible to isolate 41 components including 176 journals. We comment, first, on the three weak components with the biggest number of journals 
